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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No. 20489
vs.
TRI-O, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Respondents (hereinafter separately referred to as "Groen" or "Rocky
Mountain") assert that the prior decision of the Court in this matter, Groen vs.
Tri-0, Inc., 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) is determinative of the issues raised
under Point I of Appellant's brief concerning the application of the doctrine of
express warranty to the facts of this case.

(Appellant is hereinafter referred

to as "Tri-0").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Respondents adopt Tri-0's statement as to the nature of the case.
Course of Proceedings Below
Respondents adopt Tri-0's statement of the course of the proceedings
below.

Statement of Facts
Prior to the occurrence of the accident in question, Tri-0 entered
into a contract with the Bureau of Land Management to string power lines near
Wellington, Colorado.

The BLM required that the work be done with the use of

helicopters in order to preserve the environment.
Tri-0 contracted with a helicopter company to string the power lines.
However, the first pilot was incompetent and was terminated by Tri-0 (tr.711,
745).

The second pilot was competent, but due to a dispute with Tri-0 he left

the job after a short period of time (tr.711-12).

These and other problems put

the job seriously behind schedule (tr.240).
Subsequent to the departure of the second pilot, Tri-0 contacted Rocky
Mountain and requested that Rocky Mountain supply a helicopter and pilot to
continue the job.

Rocky Mountain accepted the offer and entered into a contract

with Tri-0 (Ex.18).

Kenneth dinger, the Tri-0 representative who subsequently

made the warranties to Groen, signed the contract on behalf of Tri-0 (tr.714).
Pursuant to the contract, Rocky Mountain was to supply a pilot and helicopter
and Tri-0 was to supply the ropes and other materials necessary to do the job
(tr.745).

Pursuant to the contract, Rocky Mountain sent Groen to the site to

string the power lines.

He was accompanied by another pilot, Joe Candlish who

Groen was to train in the art of stringing power lines (tr.53).
In stringing power lines with the use of a helicopter, the side of the
aircraft is equipped with a frame.
of rope is attached to the hook.

On the frame is a hook.

A ten foot length

At the end of the ten foot rope is a ten pound

swivel which minimizes the effects of twisting and provides sufficient weight in
the event the rope must be discarded.
foot length of rope.

Attached to the ten pound swivel is a 100

Attached to the 100 foot length of rope is a small two

pound swivel with a diameter approximating the diameter of the rope.

On the

other side of the small swivel is a steel cable several miles in length which is
wrapped around a large reel.

As the helicopter strings the wire, the reel

turns, permitting the release of the cable (tr.59-73).
The electrical towers are equipped with "travellers."

A traveller is

merely a metal frame attached near the porcelain insulator on the tower.

The

traveller has a one-way door that will allow the rope to enter inside the frame,
but will not allow the rope, once inside, to get out of the frame.

The bottom

portion of the traveller is equipped with pulleys that permit the rope, or
cable, once inside the traveller, to be easily pulled (tr.59-73).
With the rope and cable assembly attached, the helicopter flies
sideways over the tower and drops the rope on a small arm attached to the
traveller which allows the rope to slide into the traveller (the traveller arm
should not be confused with the tower arm). Once the rope is inside, the
helicopter proceeds to the next tower and repeats the operation.

After several

towers have been strung, the electrical wire is attached to the cable and pulled
through the travellers.

Electricians then climb the towers and attach the

electrical wires to the insulators (tr.59-73).
In this type of operation, the helicopter flies only 100 to 150 feet
above the ground at a relatively slow speed (tr.59-73).

When flying at these

speeds and altitudes, the pilot is in what is called the "dead man's curve"
(tr.57-59).

When a pilot has a power failure in the "dead man's curve" he

cannot achieve sufficient velocity to auto-rotate the rotor blades to permit a
soft landing (tr.57-59).

It is for this reason that the strength of the 100

foot length of rope is extremely important.
When a helicopter flies sideways, the rotor blades are tipped slightly
in the direction of the travel (tr.66).

The lift created by the spinning blades

then pulls the helicopter in the desired sideway direction (tr.54-57).

In a wire pulling operation, snags are common and cannot be prevented
(tr.65,770).
traveller.

They usually occur when the rope goes between the pulleys in the
When a snag occurs, the rope performs two functions: first, it acts

as a shock absorber; second, as it resists the helicopter's momentum it pulls
the helicopter from its tipped position to a horizontal position thereby
releasing pull on the rope and the aircraft (tr.65-67).

This gives the pilot

sufficient time to cut the power and release the rope so the snag can be
corrected (tr.67).

Obviously, a weak rope is dangerous inasmuch as it may break

and make the helicopter vulnerable to the possibility of "snap back.11
Pursuant to the contract between Rocky Mountain and Tri-0, Groen
arrived at the "show-up yard" (the place designated for the crew to meet before
going to the job site).

There he held a safety meeting with the crew and then

inquired of the highest ranking Tri-0 employee, Kenneth Clinger (tr.79), if he
could see the ropes that were being supplied by Tri-0 for use on the job
(tr.80).

Clinger noted that the actual ropes were already attached out at the

site where the work was to be performed, but showed Groen the same type of rope
on a spool in the show-up yard (tr.81).
(hereinafter "PD-10") (tr.716).

The rope was 1/2 inch polypropylene

When Groen observed the rope, he immediately

voiced an objection, noting that it was too small in diameter, was not the type
of construction he had used before, and did not appear adequate (tr.80-81).
Clinger admitted the fact of Groen's objection to the rope (tr.716-17,741).
Groen 1 s objection was so forceful that Clinger thought the job may again be shut
down (tr.749-50).

Groen demanded 3/4 inch Sampson rope, noting that he had used

it before and was satisfied as to its reliability (tr.81).

Tri-0 1 s statement in

its brief that Groen testified differently in the first trial, i.e., that he did
not specifically designate 3/4 inch diameter, is false.
first trial, p.268).

(See transcript of

Inasmuch as the job was already behind schedule, dinger immediately
began attempts to persuade Groen to use the rope over Groen's objection.

In

unequivocable terms, dinger told Groen that the rope was adequate for the job,
that it was as strong as Sampson rope, and, referring to a large piece of
equipment, stated "it will hold that cat over a cliff" (tr.80-81,86),

These

unequivocable statements made by Kenneth dinger were corroborated by Joe
Candlish (tr.787).

Although dinger denied making the statements, his denial

was impeached to some extent by prior deposition testimony (tr.751,774-775) and
cross examination established doubt as to the truth of his denial (tr.754-757),
In a further attempt to persuade Groen to use the PD-10, dinger
promised to send a runner to Denver to obtain the requested Sampson rope
(741-742).

Although Denver was only 100 miles away, the rope had still not

arrived on the next day after the promise was made (tr.753-754).
The men then went from the show-up yard to the site where the work was
to be performed.

The PD-10 rope was already assembled and needed only to be

attached to the helicopter.

Upon observing the rope, Groen again objected,

noting the small diameter, flimsy appearance and different construction than he
was accustomed to (tr.85-87).

Groen again requested 3/4 inch Sampson rope

(tr.86).
In response to Groenfs second objection, and motivated by a desire to
not further delay the already slow-moving job (tr.750), dinger again repeated
his warranties concerning the rope, stating in unequivocable terms that it was
adequate for the job, that it was as strong as Sampson rope, and that "it would
hold that cat over a cliff" (tr.87).

These repeated warranties by dinger were

also corroborated by Joe Candlish (tr.790-91).
In order to add credibility to his statements concerning the adequacy
of the rope, Clinger stated to Groen that dinger was knowledgeable concerning

rope strengths and had done extensive reading concerning ropes and their uses
(tr.754-55,89-90).

Groen had no experience with respect to ropes except his

observations as to the adequacy of the 3/4 inch Sampson rope (tr.85-86,89-90).
In making these warranties, dinger imposed no conditions regarding
the speed of the helicopter or the technique used by the pilot in stringing the
lines (tr.758,173,94-95).
As pilot-in-command, Groen had the absolute right to refuse to fly if
he felt the conditions were unsafe regardless of any provisions in the contract
requiring flight,

dinger acknowledged Groen's right to refuse to fly under

unsafe conditions (tr.739).

However, by reason of dinger's unequivocable

assurances and his claimed expertise on the subject, Groen consented to use the
rope (tr.90,97).
As Groen commenced the job, he discovered that the travellers that had
been installed on the towers were of a type not previously encountered by him.
The primary difference was that they were not anchored and would rotate when
contacted by the rope (tr.63).

Thus, Groen had to experiment to determine how

best to lay the rope into the traveller without rotating it (tr.63,67).

He

finally concluded that the best system was to lay the rope on the porcelain
insulator and allow it to slide down onto the traveller arm (tr.67-68).

After a

short period of time, he was able to increase his speed using this technique
(tr.191).

The propriety of this type of experiment was confirmed by Tri-0's

expert (tr.1047).

Contrary to the claims of Tri-0, contact between the rope and

the tower arm was unintended and infrequent (tr.68).

Accidental contact with

the tower arm is common (tr.68,1070).
During the first day of flight, Groen was observed by Kenneth dinger,
the individual who had made the warranties concerning the rope.

Groen and

dinger were in constant radio contact during this period of observation

(tr.93-94,1176).

After Groen became accustomed to the characteristics of the

travellers, he was able to develop a technique and increase his speed
(tr.93-94).

During the period of dinger's observation, Groen flew at the same

speeds and used the same technique as he used the next day when the accident
occurred (tr. 1176-77).

At no time during dinger's observations, did dinger

tell Groen that his speed or technique invalidated the warranties that dinger
had previously made (tr.93-94).

Thus, Groen proceeded at his chosen speed and

technique in reliance on what had been told him concerning the adequacy and
strength of the rope.
The first day proceeded without incident.

On the second day, the

Sampson rope had not arrived so Groen again proceeded to string the cables with
the PD-10 rope still relying on the warranties previously stated by dinger
(tr.97).

He commenced the operation at the same speed and using the same

technique as dinger had observed the previous day (tr.1176-77).

After

stringing approximately eight towers, the rope snagged and broke at a point near
the tower arm (tr.101).

The 100 foot length of rope snapped back in the

direction of the helicopter and contacted the rotating mast (tr.101-02).

As the

rope wrapped around the mast, it influenced the controls causing the pitch of
the blades to turn downward (tr.115-16).

As the blades fell, they began hitting

the body of the helicopter, severing the tail boom and ultimately removing the
plastic bubble over the cockpit (tr.115-16).

With the tail boom removed, the

helicopter began spinning violently in the opposite direction of the rotor
blades and the helicopter fell approximately 120 feet to the ground (tr.102-05).
The rope that was involved in the accident, previously warranted by
Kenneth dinger, was analyzed by the world's foremost expert on ropes, David
Himmelfarb.

His testimony established, without contradicting testimony, that

the rope was inadequate for the job and was only a fraction of the strength of

the weakest 3/4 inch Sampson rope (tr.402-10,400-02,Ex.22).

This uncontradicted

testimony clearly established that the warranty made by Kenneth dinger, a duly
authorized agent of Tri-0, had been breached.
The statements made by Tri-0 several times in its Brief that the
landing was a "soft landing" because the rotor blades cushioned the fall is
absolutely false.

It was a violent fall with several factors simultaneously

increasing the force.

The downward pitch of the blades actually propelled the

helicopter to the ground faster than the force of gravity.

The severing of the

tail boom caused the body of the helicopter to whirl in the opposite direction
of the blades.

The length of the fall was approximately 125 feet and the force

of the impact was so great that it tore apart the metal seatbelt buckle
(tr.101-05,115-16).
Groen hit the ground in a sitting position.

The force of the impact

caused extensive tearing of the muscles in his neck and back (tr.549,553-55).
As the muscles healed, there was extensive scar tissue remaining.

The force of

the impact also has resulted in nerve disfunction in the spinal area
(tr.558-59).

The result has been continuous pain and permanent disability of

37-40 percent of the entire person (tr.550-51).
science can do to relieve the pain.

There is nothing medical

The extent of the untreatable pain was so

great that Groen was ultimately referred to the L.D.S. Hospital Pain Clinic and
participated in a program to assist him in psychologically coping with the pain
(tr.548,267-77,124-136).
Groen had always had a desire to become a pilot from early childhood
(tr.39).

On the date of this accident, he intended on continuing as a career

pilot (tr.148).

After graduation from high school, he joined the Army inasmuch

as it was the only branch of service that would accept an applicant for flight
training without a college education (tr.39).

He entered the Army's flight

school for the purpose of commencing a career as a helicopter pilot (tr.39-40).
He served gallantly in Vietnam and was shot down seven times.

On each occasion

his skill as a pilot enabled him to make a soft landing.
After his discharge from the Army, Groen immediately sought work as a
helicopter pilot.

Due to the unavailability of immediate work he worked unsuc-

cessfully as a salesman (tr. 40-42).

He finally obtained his first job as a

helicopter pilot in February, 1973 (tr. 40). At the time of the accident in
May, 1977, he was one of the most respected pilots in his field (tr.1052).
After the accident, Groen made eyery attempt to hold onto his chosen
vocation.

However, the rigors of wire pulling—the area where he was most

talented--was abandoned inasmuch as it required him to bend sideways.
time of the first trial (January, 1981) he was still flying.

At the

However, he

frequently had to ground himself due to extreme pain or the effects of pain
medications.

Moreover, he had to accept piloting jobs that required less effort

and resulted in lower pay (tr.126-129,162,601-02,ex.64).
Soon the rigors of his chosen profession were too much and Groen
permanently discontinued flying in the summer of 1981 (tr.149).

He was turned

down for a flight physical shortly prior to the second triar ' (tr.150,ex.53).
His treating physician confirmed that Groen will never fly again (tr.553).
Having no other job skills (tr.38), and being physically unable to do any medium
or heavy work, Groen's earning capacity went from the lucrative salary of a
helicopter pilot to a level near the minimum wage (tr.448-49).

Even at minimum

wage, job availability is limited inasmuch as his injuries preclude him from
full-time employment (tr.450).

Groen knew before taking the physical that he could not pass it. He took
the physical at the request of his attorney so there would be no doubt in
the matter (tr.150).

Fortunately, Groen's brothers started a recycling company and hired
Groen as a bookkeeper (tr.326-27).

Due to family considerations, he was paid

more than he could earn in a competitive climate (tr.451,163).

However, the

salary is much less than he would earn as a helicopter pilot and the continued
survival of the new recycling business is uncertain (tr.326,341).
At the time of the second trial, Groen was employed in the family
business earning $250.00 per week when the business could afford to pay him
(tr.326,123).

He was still plagued by continuous pain and disability

(tr.129-135).

There was competent evidence that his loss of earning capacity

alone was in excess of One Million Dollars (Ex.74).

The jury found in favor of

Respondents and awarded Groen damages of $975,000 (R.1599).

The value of the

helicopter was stipulated to be $37,500.
After the commencement of the appeal in this matter, Groen filed a
motion for an accelerated hearing based upon the fact that, unlike the vast
majority of litigants presently involved in appeals before this Court, he has
been twice subjected to the appeal process with the delays inherent therein.
Since the date of the accident in May, 1977, a period of more than eight years,
Groen has experienced a standard of living drastically below the level of his
capabilities prior to the accident together with a daily pattern of pain and
disability without any compensation from the party which the jury found to be
responsible for such damage.

Groen respectfully requests the Court to bear in

mind the period of his hardship in rendering a decision in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The argument that the law of express warranty is inapplicable to

the circumstances of this case is resolved by this Court's prior decision in
this matter.

II.

Despite the fact that there was no money or other item of value

paid to Tri-0, the warranty is nevertheless enforceable by reason of Respondents' detrimental reliance and modification of an executory contract.

Moreover,

Groen's reliance cannot be considered as the performance of a pre-existing
contractual duty.

Despite the existence of the contract between Tri-0 and Rocky

Mountain, Groen was not obligated to proceed inasmuch as a pilot-in-command need
not fly if he regards conditions as being unsafe,
III.

There was competent and persuasive evidence that the warranty was

the cause of the accident and that Groen did not misuse the rope.

Tri-0's

argument to the contrary is merely an attempt to persuade this Court to weigh
the evidence thereby invading the province of the jury.
IV.

Tri-0 admitted at trial that instructions 10-13 considered

individually were accurate statements of the law.

Tri-0 now argues that the

"cumulative effect" of these instructions makes the warranties appear absolute.
The jury instructions clearly stated, over the objections of Respondents, that
there were limitations on the warranties.
V.

Evidence of the book to which Groen contributed was not "newly

discovered evidence" within the meaning of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

All available evidence concerning the book was at the disposal of

Tri-0 prior to the conclusion of the trial and much of this evidence was in fact
presented to the jury.
VI.

The summary of evidence of the economist was necessary by reason

of many alternative factual circumstances.

Some of the alternative factual

circumstances reflected concessions made by the witness on cross examination.
Tri-0 was free to submit its own
VII.

exhibit had it so desired.

During the trial, Respondents suggested a verdict form separately

stating special and general damages.

The form used, which did not separately

state special and general damages, was prepared and submitted by Tri-O.

Tri-0

has therefore waived any objection to the form.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF EXPRESS WARRANTY IS APPROPRIATE
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
After failing in the first appeal in this matter to convince this
Court to refuse application of the law of express warranty to the circumstance
of this case, Tri-0 submits the same argument again asking the Court to reexamine and overrule a decision that is barely two years old thereby changing
the law of the case and making the second trial in this matter superfluous.

No

reasons are given other than the reasons argued on the first appeal.
The evidence considered by the Court during the course of the first
appeal and the evidence to be considered in this appeal are substantially
identical insofar as liability is concerned.

In fact, much of the evidence

presented at the second trial was read from the transcript of the first trial.
Those witnesses that appeared personally testified as to the same facts and
circumstances as in the first trial.

Thus, there is nothing that would change

the Court's prior decision.
This Court in the first appeal clearly and unequivocably held that the
law of express warranty is applicable in the circumstances of this case.

That

decision was based on an extensive analysis of decisions of this and other
Courts.

Therefore, in response to Tri-0's argument, Respondents rely on the

best and most persuasive authority on the subject, Groen vs. Tri-0, Inc., 667
P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), and the case cited therein.
It is interesting to note, that Tri-0 admits the applicability of the
law of express warranties to leases and bailments.

The admission is supported

by prior decisions of this Court.

Shurtleff vs. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168

(Utah 1980); Acme Crane Rental Co. vs. Ideal Cement Co., 14 Utah 2d 300, 383
P.2d 487 (1963).

Tri-0 ignores the similarity between the facts of this case

and a lease or bailment situation and makes no attempt to distinguish the
similar circumstances.

Certainly the transaction involved in the instant case

is more nearly related to situations where express warranties are traditionally
applicable than in Quagliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301
(Utah 1975) (express warranty arising out of contract for professional services)
and Welchman vs. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 353 P.2d 165 (1960) (express warranty
arising out of real estate transaction). In both cases, this Court applied the
law of express warranty.
Respondents submit that it would be an extraordinary decision for a
Court to overrule a prior decision in the same case.

Such a decision would

ignore the time limits on a motion for rehearing (Rule 35, U.R.A.P.) and would
violate the doctrine of res judicata. See Searle Bros, vs. Searle, 588 P.2d 689
(Utah 1978); In re Town of West Jordan, 326 P.2d 105 (Utah 1958); Tolman vs.
Tolman, 461 P.2d 433 (Idaho 1969).
POINT II
THE EXPRESS WARRANTY IS NOT UNENFORCEABLE DUE TO
LACK OF CONSIDERATION
A.

The Warranty is Enforceable by Reason of Groen's Detrimental
Reliance.

The conversation between Groen and Clinger was not mere passing
comments.

Because Groen would be flying in the "dead man's curve," the

strength, structure and propensities of the rope were of critical importance to
his life and safety (tr.65,762).

Clinger admitted that Groen's objection was so

significant that Clinger believed Groen would refuse to fly (tr.749-750)—a

right reserved by the pilot-in-command regardless of any contractual provision
(tr.739).
Since the job had already been substantially delayed and the Highway
Patrol was ready to stop traffic for the pull over the highway, Clinger realized
that he must be persuasive in order to induce Groen to fly with the PD-10 rope
(tr.750).

It was is this context that Clinger noted his extensive expertise

with respect to the strengths and applications of rope and unequivocably stated
that the rope "would hold a cat over a cliff,11 it was adequate for the job and
was just as strong as Sampson.

The last statement was known by Clinger to be

false (tr.766).
Groen relied on these statements and used the rope (tr.90,94,101).
This reliance on the part of Groen provides a sufficient basis to enforce the
warranty.

Section 90, Restatement (2d), Contracts (1977) provides as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forebearance on the part of the promisee or
a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach
may be limited as justice requires.

This Court has accepted the principle set forth in Section 90.

Union Tankcar

Co. vs. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964).
The most persuasive authority on the subject is Quagliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2nd 301 (Utah 1975).

In that case plaintiff

desired to build a home from some plans that plaintiff had already obtained.
Plaintiff entered into a contract with an engineer to modify the plans.
engineer modified the plans and therefore performed the contract.

The

However, at

the time the contract was performed, plaintiff had not yet selected a lot upon
which to build the home.
When plaintiff finally selected the lot, plaintiff asked the engineer
to determine if the lot was suitable for the house and objectives plaintiff

desired with respect to the house.

The engineer inspected the lot and un-

equivocably stated to plaintiff that the lot was adequate.

In reliance on that

statement—which statement was extraneous to the original contract—plaintiff
purchased the lot and commenced construction.

It was later discovered, during

the course of construction, that the lot was totally inadequate for the home.
This Court held that despite the absence of any additional consideration for the engineer's statement concerning the adequacy of the specific
lot, the engineer's statement constituted a warranty that was enforceable by
reason of plaintiff's reliance thereon.

In support of the holding, this Court

cited Restatement, Contracts (2d), Section 90.
B.

The Warranty Was a Modification of an Executory Contract and Therefore Does
Not Require Additional Consideration.
A warranty is an agreement which refers to the subject matter of a

contract, but which is collateral to its main purpose.

17A C.J.S. §342.

be made during contract negotiations or after a contract is entered into.

It may
If it

is made after the contract is entered into, there is authority that it is to be
treated as a contract modification without the necessity of additional
consideration.
The notes to U.C.C. §2-313, which discuss the general common law of
express warranty as well as the statutory law relating to sales, state that a
warranty should be treated as a contract modification.

Note 7 to §2-313 states

the following with respect to express warranties:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation
are made or samples are shown is not material. The sole
question is whether the language or samples or models are
fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If the
language is used after the closing of the deal ... the
warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported
by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order.

In Quagliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders, Supra, this Court, as an alternative
holding to that previously described, confirmed that a warranty made after the
formation of a contract was enforceable as a contract modification.
Section 89 of the Restatement, (2d), of Contracts states:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully
performed on either side is binding: (a) if the modification
is fair and equitable in view of the circumstances not
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or (c) to the extent
that justice requires enforcement in view of material change
of position in reliance on the promise.
It is clear that all of the requisites of Section 89 are present in
this instance and that the contract modification should be enforced.
In the instant case, the factual circumstances lend themselves to a
permissible contract modification.

The contract between Tri-0 and Rocky

Mountain did not specify the diameter, structure or strength of the rope that
was to be supplied by Tri-0 (Ex.18).

Thus, when this unforeseen circumstance

arose, it was necessary for the parties to negotiate further in the face of
Groen1s genuine concern for his own safety.

It was in these circumstances that

Groen objected to the rope, and Clinger stated the express warranties with
respect to the rope in order to induce Groen to abandon his objection.
Other circumstances also lend themselves to construe the conversation
between Groen and Clinger as a modification of the contract.

Groen, as pilot-

in-command, had an absolute right to refuse to fly if he deemed flight unsafe
despite any pre-existing contract (tr.739).

Thus, it is erroneous to state that

Groen had a pre-existing duty to fly under these circumstances.

In fact,

Clinger believed that Groen was going to exercise this right on the first day of
flying (tr.749-750).

Thus, the warranties stated by Clinger addressed Groen's

right to refuse to fly and therefore constituted a modification of the
agreement.

On the basis of the foregoing, the warranty was enforceable either on
the basis of detrimental reliance or modification or an executory contract, or
both.
POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF CAUSATION AND ABSENCE OF MISUSE WERE
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE
A.

The Opinion of Dr. Flandro Together With Other Evidence Provided a Sound
Basis for the Jury to Reject the Testimony of Dr. Or!oft.
Prior to trial, Dr. Kenneth Orloft created a complex computer program

which he testified was based on tests he had made on the strengths of various
component parts of the frame of a similar helicopter.

Using this program, and

using the given breaking strengths of various ropes, he concluded that if Groen
had been using 3/4 inch Sampson rope, the rope would not have broken but the
helicopter would have been torn apart.
Tri-0 argues that this testimony was uncontroverted in that Dr. Gary
A. Flandro, who rendered a contrary opinion, was not qualified to do so inasmuch
as Dr. Flandro had not conducted similar tests with respect to the strengths of
the frame of the helicopter.

This contention has no merit.

Dr. Flandro, having

not conducted similar tests of the frame of the helicopter, assumed all of Dr.
Orloft's data was true (tr.1161).

Thus, it made no difference that he had not

personally compiled the data used by Dr. Orloft.

In overruling Tri-O's

objection that Dr. Flandro had not conducted sufficient studies and tests, the
Court recognized the basis upon which Dr. Flandro was testifying: "my
understanding his testimony is he f s accepting all of the data as produced by
your [Tri-O's] expert witness in simply giving an opinion with that as his
basis" (tr.1163).

After assuming the truth of Dr. Orloft's analysis, Dr. Flandro
testified that by reason of the large number of complex variables necessary to
make such conclusions, Dr. Orloft1s conclusions as to what would occur in the
hypothetical situation were unreliable (tr.1162-64).
Dr. Flandro is well qualified in the field of mechanical engineering
and aerodynamics (tr.283-86).

The jury was entitled to accept his testimony

over that of Dr. Orloft.
It is important to note, that the jury could reasonably reject the
testimony of Dr. Orloft without even considering the testimony of Dr. Flandro.
There were several fatal flaws in Dr. Orloft's analysis and, in addition, there
was competent testimony from witnesses other than Dr. Flandro that contradicted
the conclusions of Dr. Orloft.
First, as previously noted, the rope is attached to a side hook on the
helicopter located at the horizontal center of gravity of the helicopter.
the helicopter flies sideways, it is tipped in the direction of travel.

As
The

force created by the blades is then in line with the rope and exerts its maximum
force against the helicopter and the rope.

When a snag occurs, and tension

increases in the rope, and the tension automatically pulls the helicopter from
its tipped position to a horizontal position thereby relieving much of the force
exerted directly against the helicopter and rope causing the helicopter to move
back in the direction of the rope thereby removing the force.

This phenomenon

was confirmed by David Groen (tr.65-67,197-98,333-34,1177), by Don Lederhous
(Tri-O's expert in helicopter operation) (tr.1049) and by Dr. Flandro
(tr.291-92).

It is apparent that this phenomenon is critical to an accurate

assessment of the forces exerted on the helicopter in the event of a snag.

The

critical nature of the phenomenon was admitted by Dr. Orloft (tr.1153-54).

Dr.

Orloft further admitted that his computer program did not take into account this

phenomenon (tr.1130-33).

On this basis alone, the jury could reasonably reject

Dr. Orloftfs conclusions.
Second, Dr. Or!oft was unaware that the rope was attached to the
helicopter through a small metal arch that was welded to the frame (tr.1132-35).
The small arch can be seen on Exhibit 87.

It was apparent to anyone, including

Dr. Or!oft, that the small metal arch would be torn away long before the
helicopter frame would be damaged (tr.1132-35).
by Dr. Flandro (tr.1164-69).

This obvious fact was confirmed

The tearing away of the metal arch would not

threaten the safety of the pilot inasmuch as the hook would automatically
release (tr.1157-58).

Dr. Orloft admitted that he did not know the amount of

force required
to tear the metal arch away from the helicopter (tr.1135).

Dr. Orloft further

admitted that if the small welded metal arch was torn away, there would be no
stress placed on the frame of the helicopter (tr.1135).

This evidence totally

undermined the testimony of Dr. Orloft and provided the jury with another sound
basis to reject his conclusions.
Third, Groen testified that he had previously experienced snags at
thirty miles per hour and the rope did not break and the helicopter was not
damaged (tr.1177).

The jury could reasonably accept this testimony over that of

Dr. Orloft.
Finally, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the helicopter would
be damaged as Dr. Orloft speculated, it would not necessarily mean that a crash
would occur (tr.1177).

This fact was admitted by Dr. Orloft (tr.1142-44).

Thus, Tri-0 failed in its burden of proof that the failure of the rope was not
the cause of the accident.

B.

There Was Competent Evidence From Which the Jury Could Find That Groen Did
Not Misuse the Rope.
Tri-0 argues that despite the fact that Clinger made no mention of any

limitation on the warranties, he nevertheless subjectively intended a limitation
with respect to speed and technique and that Groen f s speed and technique
exceeded the scope of the warranty and thereby constituted misuse of the rope.
Tri-0 contends that the trial Court, as a matter of law, should have found that
Groen misused the rope.
There is no legal basis for this argument.

The law is clear that a

warrantor must state any limitations on his warranty J.I. Case Credit Corp. vs.
Andreason, 408 P.2d 165 (Idaho 1965).. Clinger gave no indication of any
restrictions or limitations on the warranty (tr.173).
were known only to Clinger.

The limitations, if any,

Moreover, the jury could have found that Clinger

had no subjective limitation as to speed, inasmuch as, at the
time he made the warranty, he had no opinion as to how fast a helicopter should
travel while stringing line (tr.748).
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that dinger's subjective
limitations are relevant, there is a sound factual basis for the jury to find
that Clinger did not intend such limitations.

After making the warranties,

Clinger observed Groen pulling the rope at the same speeds and using the same
technique as he used on the day of the accident.

At the time of the obser-

vation, Clinger and Groen were in radio contact with each other (tr.
93-94,1176-77).

While observing Groen's technique and a speed of 20-30 miles

per hour, Clinger made no comment about "unorthodox" flying or his alleged
subjective limitations on the warranty (tr.93-94).

Therefore, Groen could

reasonably believe that he was not exceeding the scope of the warranty, i.e.,
misusing the rope.

Moreover, from this evidence the jury could reasonably

conclude that dinger had no subjective limitations on the warranty and did not
believe that Groen's speed was "unorthodox."
On the day of the accident, John David, a duly authorized agent of
Tri-0 and the second-in-command at the job-site, was also present when Clinger
made the warranty.
accident.

John David observed Groen's entire flight on the date of the

Despite radio contact between John David and Groen, he likewise did

not make any comment about restrictions on the warranty or the alleged "unorthodox" speed and technique (tr.98,101).
If Tri-0 is assumed not to have any duty to state any restrictions or
limitations on the warranty at the time it was made, it certainly should have
such a duty when the agents who made the warranty observe the limitations or
restrictions being exceeded. The failure to make any statement as to Groen's
speed or technique further provides the jury with a sound basis to conclude that
no restrictions of limitations of the warranty were intended.
Tri-0's claim that Groen's technique and speed were "unorthodox" is
not supported by the evidence.

The evidence established that there is no

generally accepted standard with respect to speed or technique.

Tri-0's claim

of "unorthodox" flying is based solely on a comparision of the practices of
other pilots, primarily Don Lederhous.

In this regard, Don Lederhous testified

as follows:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

We've talked a lot about how everybody else strings wire
in this proceeding. Wouldn't it be true, Mr. Lederhous,
that there really is no single correct method of flying
wire?
That's probably correct, yes.
And under different conditions and given the different
talents of pilots, their technique, their speed, all of
the things may differ?
That's true.
There's no accepted standard of flying wire that you
know of?
Not that I know of, no. I would say that it'd be up to
the pilot.

Q.
A.

And speaking generally about-let me ask this. Given one
pilot's technique, you wouldn't say that he's doing it
wrong merely because he does it differently than you do?
No, sir.

Q.

And when we have had pilots look at other pilots up in
the air and say that's the way that guy does it, that
doesn't mean that guy is right and another guy is wrong?

A.

That's true (tr.1044).

After admitting that Groen's greater speed and different technique did
not necessarily mean that Groen was wrong, Lederhous admitted that he has pulled
wire at speeds of 25 miles per hour and that there could be a 5 mile per hour
margin of error in his estimate (tr.1051-52).

Thus, he may have flown as fast

as Groen was flying on the date of the accident.

Lederhous further admitted

that he has observed other pilots stringing wire at speeds 20-25 miles per hour
(tr.1051).
The evidence is clear that Groen was more experienced and talented
than other pilots who did wire pulls (tr.1052,50).

From this evidence, the jury

could conclude that Groen's greater speed and different technique were the
product of his experience and talent rather than a departure from a non-existent
standard of care.
Even if Lederhous had testified that Groen's speed and technique were
"unorthodox," his testimony was contradicted by Groen who also was a qualified
expert (tr.93-94).

The jury had the perogative of accepting Groen's testimony

over that of Lederhous.

This evidence alone precludes the Court from finding,

as a matter of law, that Groen misused the rope.
Even if the evidence supported Tri-0's claim that Groen's speed of
20-30 miles per hour constituted "unorthodox" flying, it makes no difference
inasmuch as there is no causal connection between the speed and the failure of
the rope.

Tri-0's expert witness acknowledged that speeds as fast as 20 miles

per hour is acceptable (tr.1048-49).

The same witness stated that an average

speed is 15 miles per hour (tr.1048-49).
error in both figures (tr.1049-52).

There is a 5 mile per hour margin of

The uncontradicted testimony established

that the rope would have broken at a speed of 16 miles per hour
(tr.1145-46,288).

Thus, even if Groen was flying at speeds acceptable to Tri-0,

the accident would still have occurred.

Therefore, any speed in excess of 16

miles per hour has no causal connection with the accident.
With respect to Groen's technique of laying the rope on the insulators, no one offered any testimony that such a practice was unreasonable or
that such a practice increased the risk of accident.

Even if such testimony

were offered, the jury was entitled to accept Groen!s testimony that such
practice was acceptable.
During the course of the first trial in this matter, the same evidence
now asserted in support of Tri-0's claim of product misuse was asserted in
support of a claim of Groen's negligence.
onerated Groen of any negligence.
of any product misuse.

The jury in the first trial ex-

The jury in the second trial exonerated Groen

In the face of these findings, it would be an extra-

ordinary ruling to find product misuse as a matter of law.
There was persuasive evidence that Groen's speed and technique were
proper in the circumstances.

Even in the absence of such evidence, Groen's

speed and technique had no causal connection with the accident.

Thus, there is

no basis to find product misuse as a matter of law.
POINT IV
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EXPRESS WARRANTY
WERE ACCURATE STATEMENTS OF THE LAW
Tri-0 complains that instructions 10-13 "had the cumulative effect of
conveying to the jury that warranties are absolute and not subject to limitation, and inadequately informed the jury that, unless the parties contemplated

otherwise, objective standards are to be applied in determining the scope of the
warranty."

Not a single case is cited in support of Tri-O's contentions.

Moreover, in taking its exceptions, Tri-0 acknowledged that each individual
instruction was proper (tr. 921-922).
A review of each instruction, and consideration of their cumulative
effect, establishes that they are neither "inadequate" nor "erroneous."
Although Tri-0 makes no separate argument concerning Instruction No.
10, Respondents will discuss each instruction separately including Instruction
No. 10.
A.

Instruction No. 10.
Tri-0 did not except to Instruction No. 10 and has, therefore, waived

any objection (tr. 921-927).

Even if such objection had not been waived, there

is no error in the instruction.

The legal principles therein set forth are all

supported by language in the Court's opinion in the first appeal in this matter.
B.

Instruction No. 11.
All of the wording in Instruction No. 11 is taken from the language

used by the Court in its opinion in the first appeal.

See

Groen vs.

Tri-0-Inc., Supra, at p. 604.
C.

Instruction No. 12.
All of the wording in Instruction No. 12 is taken from the language

used by the Court in its opinion in the first appeal.

See Groen vs. Tri-0-Inc,

Supra, at p. 604.
D.

Instruction No. 13.
Instruction No. 13 is an accurate statement of the law.

Credit Corp. vs. Andreason, 408 P.2d 165 (Idaho 1965).

J.I. Case

E.

Cumulative Effect of Instructions 10-13.
The wording of Instruction 13 contains the following statement:

11

... the recipient of the warranty has the right to assume that there are no

restrictions or limitations unless he is otherwise aware of such restrictions or
limitations or such limitations or restrictions should be reasonably foreseen by
the recipient of the warranty ...."

This language is a generous concession to

Tri-0 and overcomes its claim that the instructions had the cumulative effect of
"conveying to the jury that warranties are absolute and not subject to limitation" and "objective standards are to be applied in determining the scope of
the warranty."

Appellant's Brief, p. 40. The generous concession given to

Tri-0 is demonstrated by the holding in J.I. Case Credit Corp. vs. Andreason,
408 P.2d 165 (Idaho 1965), that a warrantor has a duty to state any limitations
on his warranty.
F,

Instruction No. 17.
Defendant complains that Instruction No. 17, stating that in the prior

trial neither party was found negligent, was "prejudicial to defendant."
Appellant's Brief, p. 42.
from Tri-0's argument.

The source of the prejudice is difficult to determine

Apparently the gravamen of Tri-0's complaint is not that

the statement is inaccurate, but that the statement was contained in Instruction
17 which also dealt with product misuse.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-42.

Tri-0 makes no explanation as to why the statement of an actual fact constitutes
error because of its placement in the instructions.

Tri-0 has no complaint that

the instructions inadequately deal with its misuse defense thereby making it
difficult to understand how Tri-0 is prejudiced by the instruction.
A review of Instructions 13 and 14 establishes that the defense of
misuse was properly presented to the jury leaving Tri-0 with no cause for
complaint.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF NEWLY DISOVERED EVIDENCE
RELATING TO A BOOK TO WHICH GROEN CONTRIBUTED
Tri-0 asserts that the facts surrounding the writing and publication
of the book Huey constituted "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 59,
U.R.C.P., thereby justifying a new trial.
A review of the wording of Rule 59 demonstrates that the argument is
without merit.

The relevant wording of the Rule is as follows:

In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly
discovered evidence the moving party must show: ... (b) by
due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at trial; and (c) the evidence must not be
merely cumulative or incidental but must be of sufficient
substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it
there would have been a different result.
The existence of the book was discovered prior to the end of the
trial.

Moreover, Groen and his brother and co-author, Jay, were present in the

courtroom to answer any questions concerning the book.

Groen answered all

questions submitted to him concerning the book (tr.613-26).

Tri-0 did not call

Jay Groen despite his presence in the courtroom during most of the trial.

Thus,

the existence of the book and any facts relating thereto cannot possibly be
deemed to constitute "evidence [that] could not have been discovered and
produced at trial."
Rule 59 further requires that the newly discovered evidence "must be
of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there
would have been a different result."

Inasmuch as all relevant evidence con-

concerning the book was presented at trial, there is no reason to believe that
presentation of the same evidence at another trial would influence the result.

The evidence concerning the book has little relevance to the issues
involved in the case.
enterprise.

Groen's success with the book was obviously a one-time

At the time of trial, he was not working on another book and had no

plans to do so (tr.626-27).

Moreover, his sole contribution to the book was

relating combat experiences and reviewing Jay Groen's manuscript describing
those experiences (tr.623-25).

Thus, Groen did not author the manuscript and,

given the absence of any other newsworthy experiences, he has no hope of a
repeat performance.

Thus, the existence of the book, and any success relating

thereto, is irrelevant to Groen's loss of earning capacity as a helicopter
pilot.
The issue in the instant litigation was the fact that Groen had been
deprived of his ability to function in his chosen profession.

The fact that

Groen may have some measure of literary talent does not bear on the fact that he
was deprived of his livelihood.
Tri-0 contends that Groen intentionally concealed the existence of the
book in pre-trial deposition testimony and at trial.

Assuming, for the sake of

argument only, that such a claim had merit, it goes only to the credibility of
Groen which is a matter for the jury only.
cealment has no basis in fact.

Moreover, Tri-O's claim of con-

First, as previously noted, the existence of the

book has little relevance to Groen's loss of ability to function in his profession.

This is especially so inasmuch as the book was obviously a one-time

venture.
book.

Thus, there was little motivation to conceal the existence of the

Secondly, at the time Groen was asked in a pre-trial deposition about

other sources of income, he had not received any income from the book (tr.615).
The deposition took place in December, 1983, prior to the time the book had been
published and prior to the time that Groen had received any revenue (tr.615).
Thus, his denial of other sources of income was accurate.

At the time of trial,

he was asked if he had any "hobbies" (tr. 612-13).

Such a question does not

necessarily call for an explanation of the book inasmuch as a one-time venture,
then completed, is not the equivalent of a "hobby."
There was no intent on Groen's part to conceal sales figures*
Groen was asked questions concerning sales figures, he stated

When

"I don't know

exactly" (tr.615) and noted the sales figures were only furnished by the
publisher every six months (tr.615).

Despite his lack of knowledge, and after

he explained that exact figures were readily available from the most recent
accounting, Tri-0 encouraged his estimate (tr.615).

Groen, in response,

estimated 20,000 copies based on dividing his recollection of his total
royalties by the per-book royalties (tr.615-616).

Again, emphasizing his lack

of specific recollection, he admitted sales could be as high as 50,000 copies,
which turned out to be accurate (See Supplementary record).

Tri-0 never

requested the publisher's accounting which was then readily available and would
have showed sales of 50,000 copies.

It is, therefore, apparent that Tri-0 had

little regard for the relevance of the evidence with respect to the book.
After the trial, a newspaper article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune
stating that the book had sales of 170,000 (See Supplementary record).

In

response, Tri-0 moved for leave to conduct post-trial discovery on sales
figures.

However, at the time of the motion, Groen had received an updated

accounting which was immediately delivered to Tri-0.

The accounting established

that the sales figures were far below 170,000 (See Supplementary record).

Upon

receipt of the accounting, Tri-0 abandoned its request for post-trial discovery.
The evidence establishes that the 170,000 figure reported in the newspaper
related to the number of books in print rather than to the number of sales (See
affidavit of Jay Groen, R.1584).

POINT VI
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT

,,

74H INTO EVIDENCE

AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ECONOMIST
Tri-0 contends that the lower Court erred in admitting Exhibit 74 into
evidence, a summary of the conclusions of economist Dr. Samuel Stewart.

Prior

to Dr. Stewart's appearance at trial, Groen had called several witnesses to
obtain foundational facts for Dr. Stewart's conclusions.

The facts, dealing

with future loss of income, involved the inherent problem of predicting the
future course of events.

Thus, the universe of alternatives and the probability

of each alternative were considered.
Involved in the analysis were several alternative questions: would the
future salaries of helicopter pilots increase at the same rate as the preceding
five years, or would it increase at the inflation rate?

Although Groen was

capable of only part-time employment at the time of trial, would he be able to
work full-time at some future date?

Although Groen's earning capacity was at

the minimum wage, he was working in a family business where, due to
family-related concessions, he was receiving a salary in excess of his earning
capacity.

Would this newly-formed family business succeed and provide him with

income in excess of his earning capacity or would it fail thereby forcing Groen
into a competitive environment where he would be reduced to the minimum wage?
With these variables, and evidence bearing on the likelihood of each
variable, there were eight difference factual circumstances open for the jury's
consideration.

In order to permit the jury to know the monetary loss

attributable to each factual alternative, Dr. Stewart calculated the loss under
all eight alternatives.

It became readily apparent that no one could remember

the details of all eight alternatives or the monetary figure attributable to
each alternative.

Thus, Groen prepared Exhibit 74 so that the facts involved

in each alternative and the computation with respect to each alternative could
be easily reviewed.

In this manner, the jury was not compelled to rely on their

recollection of each complicated alternative, thereby reducing the risk of
speculation and error.

Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable basis to

conclude that the admission of Exhibit 74 constituted an abuse of discretion.
There is no claim that the Exhibit contained any error in summarizing
the testimony.

Tri-0 1 s complaint is that the document could not be contested

during cross-examination and that it made no mention of "concessions'1 made by
Dr. Stewart during cross-examination.

The claim that the document, having been

produced after Dr. Stewart's testimony, was not subject to cross-examination is
without merit.

All of the testimony summarized in the Exhibit was orally stated

by Dr. Stewart (tr.628-39,664-66) and Tri-0 conducted extensive crossexamination on each point (tr.639-64,666-70).
The claim that the exhibit was prejudicial and did not reflect
concessions made by Dr. Stewart on cross-examination is also without merit.
First, Tri-0 was free to submit its own exhibit reflecting the claimed
"concessions."

As noted by the trial court, in denying Tri-O's post-trial

motions: "the Court received numerous illustrative exhibits from the defendant,
and would have received any exhibit illustrative of defendant's theory of
damages which was supported by competent testimony" (R.1609).

Secondly, Exhibit

74 did reflect some of the points made by Tri-0 in cross-examination, i.e., the
possibility that the recycling business would succeed.
POINT VII
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
ON SPECIAL DAMAGES
Tri-0 complains that the award of prejudgment interest on special
damages constituted error because the verdict form did not permit the jury to

state what portion of the judgment was attributable to special damages.

The

argument is without merit for two reasons: first, it was Tri-0 that prepared and
submitted the verdict form; second, there was no basis in the evidence that
could reasonably lead the jury to believe that Groen was not entitled to all
special damages.

Inasmuch as stipulations by counsel and uncontroverted evi-

dence establish that all such expenditures were necessary and reasonable, each
of the above arguments will be separately discussed.
Tri-0 did register an objection to the use of a general verdict form
rather than a special verdict form.

However, once overruled, Tri-0 prepared and

submitted the general verdict form that was ultimately used by the Court and
which omitted any reference to special damages.

Unfortunately, however, there

is no mention in the record of the fact the general verdict form originated with
Tri-0.

Respondents must rely on the good faith and recollection of opposing

counsel to establish the origin of the form.

Assuming the fact is established,

Tri-0 has waived any objection to the verdict form.

Some evidence that Tri-0

did not request a verdict with a separate statement of special and general
damages is that Tri-0's special verdict form (which was not used) contained no
space for the separate finding of special and general damages (R.1510A).

A

general verdict form that separately stated special and general damages was
suggested by counsel for Respondents (tr.926).
Even if Tri-0 did not waive its objection to the form of the general
verdict, it was not prejudiced by the failure of the form to permit a separate
finding of special damages inasmuch as there was no evidence upon which the jury
could reasonably exclude any item of special damage.
Groen identified the physicians that he had seen for treatment of the
pain and other systems that began at the time of the accident (tr.584-586) and
the amount of money expended for these services (tr.586).

Tri-0 offered no

evidence that any of these services were unnecessary or that the charges were
unreasonable.

Although Tri-0 had some reservations about the necessity of

chiropractic services, the evidence established the necessity of those services
(tr.544-45).
CONCLUSION
The proceedings in the trial court permitted all parties to fully
present their claims and defenses.

On the basis of such presentation, the jury

decided the contested issues in favor of Respondents.

Such a verdict, and

judgment, rendered more than eight years after the accident, was based on
credible and competent evidence and should be sustained.
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